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INTRODUCTION

Professor Laurens Walker's The End of the New Deal and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 1 (New Deal's End) is a thought-provoking
evaluation of the relationship between the New Deal's conclusion and
modem civil process. Professor Walker canvasses a series of recent,
puzzling changes which "present the most serious challenge to the
procedural status quo since the adoption of the original Federal Rules in
1938."2 The author finds that the New Deal's demise and the rejection of
that regime's reliance on experts, policies of centralized federal
decisionmaking, and establishment of the national government as an
instrument for social reform3 best explain these modifications. Professor
Walker admonishes proceduralists to accept inevitable political change and
to consider it when planning reform.4 Asserting that "[m]ajor change in
political structure and practice requires bold action,"5 the writer calls for
the creation of a national study group to undertake a searching review of
civil process and to craft innovative remedies for present difficulties.6
Professor Walker provocatively suggests as a fruitful source of solutions
recent welfare reform, from which he derives purportedly promising
concepts: waivers of federal strictures, enhanced local control, mandatory
research, and incentives for better management.7
New Deal's End is the latest of Professor Walker's concerted efforts to
improve procedural revision at the national level and in the ninety-four
federal district courts. He has scrutinized the processes for amending
federal and local civil procedures and devised constructive
recommendations. The author has attacked the processes' pressure points
while urging relevant decisionmakers, particularly Congress and federal
judges, to employ the tools of controlled experimentation, administrative
law, and economic analysis in altering procedure. Professor Walker's
decade of careful work on these processes spans the very period when
procedure has become increasingly balkanized. Indeed, that growing
fragmentation apparently prompted the writer's abandonment of "less
drastic ways to improve the current system" which he had previously
championed.8 The above propositions mean that New Deal's End deserves
a response. This Essay undertakes that effort.

1. Laurens Walker, The End ofthe New Deal and the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, 82
IOWAL.REV.1269(1997).
2. Id. at 1271; see id. at 1280-86.
3. See id. at 1270-71, 1273-86.
4. See id. at 1286-91.
5. Id. at 1286.
6. See id. at 1286-91.
7. Seeid.
8. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted).
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My reply first descriptively and critically assesses Professor Walker's
account of civil process. I find accurate niuch of his discussion of New
Deal political principles and their effects on the initial Federal Rules as
well as how those tenets were rejected or modified. Moreover, procedure
has recently experienced many enigmatic changes, four of which he
examines, and they may be the greatest threat to process since the 1930s.
Nevertheless, Professor Walker seemingly misconceives certain aspects of
the four alterations, such as their significance and the relevance of the New
Deal's conclusion to the modifications, and he minimally addresses other
applicable developments. In short, Professor Walker's reliance on the end
of the New Deal as an explanation for the changes enables him to recount
a rather neat story; however, what actually transpired appears more
complex, subtle and untidy. L therefore, offer complementary explanations
for the four alterations and different views of their import while
elaborating his account.
This response then affords a descriptive and critical evaluation of
Professor Walker's prescriptions. I consider their scope inadvisable. The
calls for daring action and for a national commission seem premature
partly because procedure appears less chaotic and more responsive to
treatment, especially with conventional measures, than it did three years
ago when he was writing New Deal's End. I also find troubling the method
proffered. Waivers, increased district control, and performance incentives
could be ineffective. For example, the decentralization and localization
suggested by Professor Walker would further undermine, and might even
eviscerate, the federal rule revision process and the national, uniform, and
simple system of procedure, which has facilitated expeditious, economical
and fair dispute resolution since 1938.
Despite the above concerns, Professor Walker's goal of improving
process and a few ways to attain this objective, such as compulsory
research, are valuable. Nonetheless, I favor an approach for achieving that
end through means which are similar, but comparatively moderate and
potentially more efficacious. Future reform should essentially capitalize on
the finest dimensions and recalibrate the less effective features of both the
method recommended in New Deal's End and the traditional amendment
processes. Illustrative are exhaustion of these conventional mechanisms,
somewhat enhanced reliance on local entities, and continued emphasis on
existing national institutions that have responsibility for procedure. This
approach would increase district experimentation with promising
measures, while it could revitalize and maintain the federal revision
process and the national, consistent, and simple procedural scheme which
has served Congress, the courts, and the nation well for sixty years.
Implementation of these suggestions would eliminate or at least
ameliorate many complications in modem process which apparently led
Professor Walker to write New Deal's End. If my proposals prove
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inefficacious, there will be time enough at the outset of the twenty-first
century to institute relatively extreme measures, namely the bold action
that Professor Walker advocates. In sum, as procedure approaches the
millennium, less millennial approaches may be warranted.9
I. DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT IN NEW VEAL'S END

In this Part, I descriptively and critically analyze each constituent in
Professor Walker's explanation of current process. Consensus accompanies
much in his account, although disagreement, uncertainty, and even
controversy attend some of its aspects, partly because there are insufficient
empirical data on which to premise conclusive determinations. I, thus,
adumbrate this description by exploring additional explanations for the
four alterations emphasized and different views of their importance and by
assessing other significant phenomena.
A The New Deal and Its End
Professor Walker first examines essential New Deal political
principles-use of experts, centralized decisionmaking policies, and the
federal government's establishment as an agent of social reform-and
explains how they eventually fell out of favor or came to be changed. 10 The
author concomitantly evaluates these precepts' impacts on the 1938
Federal Rules. For instance, he shows how Congress delegated authority
for adopting the Rules to the Supreme Court, which created an Advisory
Committee (Advisory or Civil Rules Committee) comprised of
distinguished law professors and practitioners and charged the expert entity
with developing proposed measures. 11 The Rules Enabling Act of 1934
correspondingly centralized at the national level all procedure governing
civil litigation in the federal district courts. 12 The Federal Rules which the
Advisory Committee drafted also enabled the courts to serve as vehicles
for social change. 13

9. This is partly an apologia and an effort to advance dialogue. Professor Walker graciously
cites my work for certain ideas, which may have been unclear, tentative or eclipsed by later
developments. See infra notes 16, 38 & 83 (showing my involvement in changes).
10. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1272-80.
11. See id. at 1273; see also Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity
and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1934). See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
909, 971-72 (1987).
12. SeePub.L.No. 73-415,48Stat 1064(codifiedasamendedat28 U.S.C. § 2072(1994));
see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1276-77. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
13. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1279; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Federal Rules Fifty
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There is some consensus regarding this account. For example,
numerous writers believe that the New Deal influenced the original Rules,
that Congress centralized civil process, and that the expert Advisory
Committee suggested a regime which permitted the courts to be social
reform agents. 14 However, certain features of the description are disputed.
For instance, the system that Congress prescribed, the Committee
proposed, and the Court adopted did not necessarily dictate the
centralization of all procedural decisions, while initial Rule 83 expressly
authorized districts to apply local measures which fostered
decentralization. The three core New Deal principles may be less
disfavored than the author claims, but even if they are, the concepts
apparently retain greater applicability to process and federal courts than to
welfare and states.
B. Four Puzzling Procedural Changes

Professor W alkerthen analyzes what he characterizes as four "puzzling
reversals of prior practice" in federal civil procedure which have occurred
over the last two decades. 15 The writer concomitantly observes that the
conclusion of the New Deal affords a general explanation for this series of
important modifications and that the proposition can be employed to guide
constructive future reform.
1. Local Procedural Proliferation
Professor Walker asserts that the first enigmatic change commenced
during the late 1970s when federal districts prescribed increasing numbers
of local strictures. 16 He reports that the Judicial Conference of the United
States responded to proliferation by commissioning a study which found
that the courts had applied more than 5,000 local procedures, many of
which contravened the Federal Rules or legislation. 17 Professor Walker
contends that the 1988 Judicial hnprovements and Access to Justice Act

Years Later: Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241-44 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. cm.
L. REV. 494, 502-05 (1986); Subrin, supra note 11, at 944-48; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNEILL. REV. 270, 273-77 (1989).
15. Walker, supra note 1, at 1280.
16. See id. at 1280-81; see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1394-1400 (1992). I served on a Ninth Circuit
committee which analyzed proliferation. See infra note 132; Tobias, supra.
17. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conf. of the U.S. Report of the
Local Rules Project. Local Rules on Civil Practice (1989); see also Walker, supra note 1, at 128081. The Conference is the federal courts' policymaking arm. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
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(JIA) 18 "significantly altered the process of making local rules [by]
requiring district courts to appoint advisory committees to assist judges in
writing local rules." 19 He cites my work for the idea that "Congress
essentially substituted forthe Civil Rules Committee ninety-four relatively
amateur entities" and describes this conclusion as "striking because it
suggests the original Rules project has been undermined."20 New Deal's
End claims that proliferation evinces.growing doubts regarding the efficacy
of centralization and that the JIA's citizen participation requirements
evidence legislative rejection of expertise.21
There is considerable agreement about this account's general contours,
namely that local measures have increased, but dispute attends several
particulars. For example, the local requirements actually appeared soon
after the initial Rules' adoption and gradually expanded until the 1970s
when districts prescribed mounting numbers of procedures under the rubric
of judicial case management to treat escalating caseloads.22 Proliferation
might indicate some concern regarding centralization's effectiveness, and
a few districts may have been addressing the national revisors' perceived
unresponsiveness to their need for tools which would efficaciously resolve
growing dockets. 23 Nevertheless, many courts adopted strictures to
experiment with promising mechanisms, to treat unusual, problematic local
conditions, and for numerous, otherreasons as idiosyncratic as the peculiar
interests or predilections ofjudges, lawyers, or litigants in specific districts.
The JIA' s public involvement requirements could correspondingly reflect
disavowal of expertise, but they may show congressional appreciation that
citizen input can improve proposals for procedural change by providing
new information and different perspectives.
Professor Walker's assertions that local rules committees would
significantly modify local revision, replace the Advisory Committee, and
erode the Rules project have not yet materialized. Many local committees

18. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of28 U.S.C.).
19. Walker, supra note 1, at 1281; see Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the
Twenty-First Century (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also 28 U.S.C. §
2077 (1988).
20. Tobias, supra note 16, at 1400; see Walker, supra note 1, at 1281. ''Yet, this significant
development lacks ... an explanation that can guide reform." Walker, supra, at 1281.
21. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience:
Mandatory lnfonnal Discovery and the Politics ofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 830 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J. L. RER>RM 647, 675-78 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Unifonnity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2016-18
(1989); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
23. I rely, in this and the next sentence, on Subrin, supra note 22, at 2018-26; Carl Tobias,
Some Realism About Federal Procedural Refonn, 49 Fu.. L. REV. 49, 58-62 (1997).
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have been quiescent or even moribund, often deferring to advisory groups
appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, while the
JIA which he argues fostered proliferation also expressly mandated its
reduction.24 The Advisory Committee has continued to study the Rules and
suggest changes, as indicated. Illustrative are the 1993 amendments, the
most ambitious set of revisions ever adopted, which included a major
amendment of Rule 11 's 1983 revision and a local option provision that
permitted districts to vary applicable federal requirements; the 1996
proposal to amend Rule 23; and the revisors' recent decisions to
commission empirical analyses of discovery and to eliminate opt-outs and
to amend the discovery rules after receiving the results.25
2. Congressional Rulemaking
Professor Walker finds that the second alteration began in the 1980s
when Congress abandoned its forty-year practice of deferring to other
revision entities and directly amended the Rules.26 The writer reports that
lawmakers revised Rule 37 to authorize fee and expense awards when the
United States violates discovery provisions; Rule 4 to release federal
marshals from routine service of process duties; and Rule 35 to permit
mental examinations by psychologists who are not doctors.27 However, he
considers most significant the 1995 passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) which purportedly amends Rule 23 in five
ways, dramatically limiting the class action's scope and implementing for
"securities litigation a novel and complex structure quite different from
Rule 23."28 Professor Walker claims that "intervention on this scale
suggests a major change in legislative perception of the Rules project,"
while it reflects rejection of the national revisors' expertise and new-found
confidence in Congress's ability to "fashion complex civil rules dealing
with important substantive topics."29

24. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1600-01, 1628-29 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 45, 126,
130-33 (suggesting apparent expiration ofCJRA and most groups and citing JIA mandates).
25. See Amendments toFederalRulesofCivilProcedure, 146 F.R.D.401 (1993); infra notes
36-37, 48-50, 53, 60-62 and accompanying text.
26. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1281-83; see also Tobias, supra note 24, at 1598.
27. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1282.
28. Id. at 1283; see Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1-77z-2,
78j-l, 78u-5i (Supp. I 1995)); see also Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995,
38 ARiz. L. REV. 717 (1996). The PSLRA may actually be more significant because it amends nine
Federal Rules.
29. Walker, supra note l,at 1283, l285;seealsoHearing BeforeHouseJudiciarySubcomm.
on Courts & Intellectual Property Federal Judiciary Oversight: Protecting Small Business, 105th
Cong. (1998) (statement of Judge William T. Hodges) (criticizing 25 bills in this Congress that
would directly amend Rules).
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Consensus, especially as to increased legislative amendment,
accompanies this broad outline, but differences exist, particularly regarding
intervention's significance. For example, there were only three direct
revisions during the 1980s, two of which tinkered with Rules 37 and 35.30
Rule 4's 1983 amendment was apparently so flawed that the Supreme
Court revamped it in 1993, an alteration to which Congress acquiesced. 31
The author may also overstate the PSLRA's importance, although he
correctly observes that the law is the most significant example of direct
revision. For instance, since the 1960s, provisions in much social
legislation, such as civil rights and environmental statutes, have modified
procedure to facilitate litigation by the Acts' intended beneficiaries.32
Professor Walker correspondingly contends that intervention of the
magnitude witnessed by the PSLRA indicates a profound change in
Congress's view ofthe Rules project, suggesting disavowal of the revisors'
expertise and greater self-assurance that it can craft sophisticated strictures
for complex areas. 33 However, his assertions might accord lawmakers too
much credit. Most did not consider, or only dimly perceived, these ideas
in voting, while adoption appears attributable more to the securities,
accounting, and other affected interests that drafted critical portions of the
PSLRA and orchestrated a gargantuan lobbying effort which narrowly
secured passage,34 or to the fulfillment of promises in the Contract With
America (Contract) when the Republican Party captured control of
Congress.35
It is important to remember that lawmakers did not approve other
central legal reforms in the Contract or significant rule revision proposals
in the 1990s, even as they enacted the PSLRA. For instance, Congress
refused to pass the Attorney Accountability Act, which would have
fundamentally amended Rule 11 soon after its major 1993 revision. 36
Congress also rejected a concerted campaign to amend Rule ll's 1993
revision which reversed the provision's 1983 amendment, the most

30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (1993 amendment); see also Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work
on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NO'l'RE DAME L. REV. 733 (1988). This undercuts the claim
of new-found confidence, but it did occur a dozen years before the PSLRA's passage.
32. Provisions govern standing, intervention and fee shifting. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 9613 (1994); see also John Leubsdorf,
Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 453-55 (1997).
33. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1283, 1285.
34. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REY. 497, 515 (1997); Carl Tobias, Refonning Common Sense Legal Refonns, 30 CONN. L. REV.
537, 550-53 (1998); see also Seligman, supra note 28.
35. SeeCarlTobias,CommonSenseand0therLegalRefonns,48VAND.L.REv.699(1995).
36. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Tobias, supra note 35, at 721-24, 729-31;
Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J.171 (1994).
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controversial alteration in the Federal Rules' history.37
3. Mandatory Local Reform
Professor Walker considers the third puzzling reversal to be the 1990
CJRA "which invited wholesale local modifications of the Rules"38 by
requiring all ninety-four districts to establish advisory groups comprised
of counsel and parties who would draft a plan with cost and delay
reduction procedures.39 The author credits Professor Linda Mullenix for
identifying the Act's "truly remarkable structural" ramifications: 40
"Congress has taken procedural rulemaking power away from judges and
their expert advisors and delegated it to local lawyers."41 He claims that
plan strictures differ across districts and with the Federal Rules, thus
continuing the decentralization movement commenced by local
proliferation; intimates that the advisory groups displace the Civil Rules
Committee; and argues that Congress dramatically altered basic court
rulemaking by assigning responsibility to local entities instead of
legislating rules. 42
There is consensus about the general description of compulsory local
reform, but the specifics are rather controversial. Perhaps most important,
Professor Walker seems to overstate the CJRA' s purposes and effects.
First, Congress prescribed instrumentalities consisting of local attorneys
and litigants to capitalize on expertise and ingenuity in the districts as well
as a core set of identical principles, guidelines, and techniques.43 Second,
most advisory groups did little after submitting their recommendations,
some of which judges rejected, while few courts adopted dissimilar
measures or ones that conflicted with the Federal Rules, aggressively
applied strictures in plans once promulgated, or fully complied with other

37. See H.R. 2979, 103d Cong. (1993); see also S. 400, 105th Cong. (1997); William J.
Hughes, Reflections from the House: Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HAILLEGIS. J. 1, 1-2 (1993).
38. Walker, supra note 1, at 1283; see also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)); Tobias, supra note 16,
at 1394. I serve on the District of Montana CJRA advisory group and have written on the CJRA.
See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 24, at 1628-29.
39. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1283; see also 28 U.S.C.§§ 471-473, 478; Tobias, supra
note 24, at 1602-04.
40. Walker, supra note l, at 1283-84; cf. Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil
Justice RefonnAct of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994).
41. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Refonnation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV.
375, 379 (1992); see also Walker, supra note l, at 1284.
42. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1284; see also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 473, 478; see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our
Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285 (1994); Tobias, supra note 16, at 1418-20. Senator
Biden was chair of the Judiciary Committee and the CJRA's chief sponsor.
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CJRA commands, such as mandates for preparing annual assessments.44
Third, Congress apparently intended that statutorily-prescribed groups and
mechanisms would expire with experimentation's conclusion, and
enforcement today is extremely limited.45 These local entities and
measures, therefore, have minimally threatened the national revision
institutions which have continued to study the Rules and suggest
amendments, when warranted,46 and the uniform, simple procedural
regime.
In short, the CJRA as written was a modest reform, and many districts
rather narrowly implemented it. The legislation, thus, constitutes no real
change and will clearly have a less profound impact on the national
revisors, the amendment process, and the Federal Rules than Professor
W alk:er predicts, particularly if the CJRA has expired and if the provisions
in the 1988 JIA and Rule 83 which proscribe local proliferation receive
application.47

4. Optional Rules
The fourth alteration that Professor Walker identifies is the 1993
amendments which authorize districts to "opt-out" of requirements in the
Federal Rules.48 Half of the courts seemed to eschew the national strictures
governing mandatory pre-discovery disclosure.49 The author relies on
Professor Lauren Robel' s work for the ideas that optional provisions
suggest the Advisory Committee's "lack of commitment" to a controversial
revision and "represent starkly the lack of consensus about even the most
fundamental aims of our procedural system."50 He declares that opt-outs
continue the decentralization trend seen in proliferation and that "[t]his
notable rejection of centralization and expertise requires a rationale."51
There is considerable agreement that the optional provisions posed
difficulty. However, it is unclear exactly how problematic they were. The
opt-outs may reflect justifiable concern regarding the efficacy of the highly
controversial disclosure technique or commendable deference to
44. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refonn Sunset, 1998 U. Iu.. L. REV. 547; Edward D.
Cavanagh, Congress' Failed Attempt to Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of the Civil Justice Refonn
Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28; see also 28 U.S.C. at§§ 472, 475.
45. See Biden, supra note 43; Tobias, supra note 44; infra notes 130..33 and accompanying
text; see also supra text accompanying note 34.
46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text
47. See infra notes 69, 126-33 and accompanying text. I have moderated my earlier views that
the CJRA might have more lasting effect See Tobias, supra note 16; Tobias, supra note 24.
48. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1284; see also Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and
Local Abrogation: In Search ofa Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REv. LmG. 49, 50 (1994).
49. See Walker, supra note l, at 1284. Many "substituted other disclosure rules." Id.
50. Robel, supra note 48, at 51; see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1284-85.
51. Walker, supra note 1, at 1285.
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Congress's passage of the CJRA and to ongoing experimentation with
various disclosure mechanisms, which was an effective way to develop the
best procedure, rather than doubts about centralization and expertise.52
Moreover, the revisors recently rectified the complications that the optional
provisions created by sponsoring empirical studies and proposing the optouts' elimination and the reinstitution of national discovery requirements,
which arguably signify what Professor Walker might term renewed
commitments to centralization and expertise.53 The opt-outs' truncated
existence and limited application to several aspects of discovery in some
districts, mean that they were primarily symbolic.

C. The End of the New Deal
Professor Walker concludes the third part of New Deal's End with
numerous illustrations of how the rejection of the New Deal's central
tenets-expertise, centralization and the federal government as an agent of
social reform-explain the four modifications emphasized, while be
proclaims that "[t]he end of the New Deal provides a general explanation
for the recent puzzling changes in federal civil rule structure."54
The author suggests that disavowal of expertise explicates certain
alterations. For instance, be finds rejection of the delegation to experts of
responsibility for rule revision in direct amendment.55 Professor Walker
correspondingly contends that legislative refutation of expertise partially
explains the major intervention in rule revision witnessed by the PSLRA' s
striking Rule 23 provisos.56 Moreover, be considers expertise's disavowal
a powerful explanation for the 1988 JIA's strictures promoting public
participation in rule amendment and for Congress's trust in "representative
group[s] of citizens assembled on a district-by-district basis."57
Professor Walker also asserts that doubts involving centralization
afford insights into some modifications. The author finds that these
concerns paralleled proliferation's growth, while the decentralization
movement begun by proliferation received impetus from widely divergent

52. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Leaming from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need
Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 304-06 (1994); John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the
Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55 Mom-. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1994).
53. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 179 F.R.D. 357 (1998); see also infra note
122 and accompanying text; Walker, supra note l, at 1285-86.
54. Walker, supra note l, at 1285. I addressed above some of these examples; hence,
footnoted, rather than textual, responses are warranted here. Compare supra notes 21, 29 and
accompanying text with infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
55. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
56. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285-86; see also supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
57. Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-25, 38-47.
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CJRA reform plans which increased local measures and additionally
balkanized procedure.58 The writer detects "further clear evidence of doubt
about the benefits of centralization" in the novel 1993 opt-out rules which
continue the trend.59
Professor Walker argues that concerns respecting the proper role of the
federal government in social reform enhance comprehension. He considers
illustrative the first proposed revision in Rule 23 since its major 1966
amendment60 and claims that the new form of class action meant only to
facilitate settlement, if adopted, will be the most significant revision in
three decades.61 The author finds that doubts about the federal government
and courts as reform agents explain the measure's support for settlement
which would diminish judges' opportunities to conduct active
policymaking through the adjudication of disputes. 62
The most instructive example of Professor Walker's reliance on the
New Deal's end as an explanation is his contention that proliferation,
CJRA mandatory local reform, and the 1993 optional rules evince
centralization's rejection and "suggest that federal civil practice is now
much more than before a matter of local determination, a situation
consistent with the analysis of contemporary politics."63 However, the
rather favorable prospects for limiting proliferation, the CJRA' s modest
commands, narrow effectuation and apparent expiration in 1997, and the
national revisors' recent decision to rescind opt-outs64 have several
implications. They show that the writer may overstate what in fact has
happened, that the developments were principally symbolic, and that any
movement toward localism is one of degree and clearly no paradigm shift,
while the New Deal's demise apparently has limited explanatory force. 65

D. Summary By Way of Friendly Critique
This illustration, and a number of additional examples which I
examined in considering the four puzzling reversals, and the New Deal's
conclusion as the reason for them, indicate certain difficulties with
58. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra text accompanying notes 16-25, 38-47.
59. Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text
60. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559 (1996); see also Walker,
supra note 1, at 1286.
61. See 167 F.R.D. at 559; see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1286. See generally
Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 CORNEILL. REV. 811 (1995).
62. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1286; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik, supra note 14, at 528-29, 549-51; Symposium: The Institute ofJudicial
Administration Research Conference on Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
63. Walker, supra note l, at 1285; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text
64. See supra notes 44-46, 53, infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
65. I had concerns about localism, but recent events moderated its effects. See supra note 9.
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Professor Walker's descriptive account. One important complication is the
author's valiant but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to afford a single
explanation for procedure's current condition.
The story of modem process, comprising a complex constellation of
phenomena, is richer and subtler as well as more dynamic and fragmented
than New Deal's End intimates. Perhaps most trenchant are the apparently
conflicting, or at least mixed, developments in procedure over the last two
decades. For example, Congress addressed proliferation with the 1988 JIA
but exacerbated it with the 1990 CJRA and partially amended numerous
rules by passing the 1995 PSLRA, even while rejecting direct revision of
Rule 11 's 1993 amendment during the 103rd and 104th Congresses and of
many other Rules in the 1990s.66 During 1983, the Supreme Court revised
Rules 11, 16, and 26 to codify and facilitate the managerial judging which
districts had conducted with proliferating strictures since the 1970s.67 In
1993, the Justices substantially changed Rule 11 's 1983 amendment,
significantly modified the 1983 revisions of Rules 16 and 26, and adopted
the opt-out provisions that fostered proliferation.68 During 1985 and 1995,
the Court amended Rule 83 in an effort to reduce proliferation.69 During
1998, the national revisors proposed altering Rule 26 again and eliminating
opt-outs.70
These and numerous additional actions which New Deal's End treats
or which I explore above demonstrate that "procedural progress" is
ephemeral and incremental, often constituting two steps forward and one
step back, lateral movements, and occasional reversals.71 The
developments illustrate the difficulty in fully apprehending a number of
recent events, particularly by overestimating their importance, because the
actions can be aberrations or temporary detours or have more symbolic
than practical impact. For instance, Congress has directly amended two
insignificant provisions and the Supreme Court overhauled the 1983
legislative revision of Rule 4 a decade later, while even the PSLRA, which
is broader and could have actual effect, partially amended certain rules
only in securities litigation.72 The CJRA' s limited mandates, circumscribed

66. See supra notes 28-29, 35-43, infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text
67. See Amendments to Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095, 1095-1104 (1983);
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text
68. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 419-47; see also
supra notes 35-36, 48-51 and accompanying text
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83, 1985 & 1995 amendments; see also Tobias, supra note 19.
70. See supra note 53 and accompanying text The 1996 proposal to amend rule 23 to
facilitate settlement has not advanced beyond the Advisory Committee. See supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text
71. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater. The Prospects for Procedural
Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 812-23 (1993); see also Marcus, supra note 22, at 675-78.
72. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text
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implementation and ostensible expiration, and the 1993 opt-outs'
apparently restricted application may mean that they were exceptions, brief
diversions, or largely symbolic.73 The history of process might well be a
"series of attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding
generation's procedural reforms."74
Professor Walker's effort to impose order upon, much less offer a lone
explanatory theory for, so many fluid and diffuse, albeit interrelated,
developments is correspondingly fraught with peril.75 Each has multiple
sources, to some of which he does not advert and others of which are ·
difficult to isolate, allow for, or identify.76 illustrative is proliferation.
Districts may have applied strictures to resolve increasing cases, to remedy
peculiar, local complications, or to experiment with promising
measures-ideas that seem tangentially related to the end of the New
Deal--or for numerous, additional reasons which resist felicitous
delineation.77 In the final analysis, one overarching idea, even a concept as
creative and capacious as the New Deal' s demise, cannot capture all of the
forces that have animated the process since the 1970s.
Despite these concerns, Professor Walker realizes considerable success
because his thought-provoking description clarifies comprehension of
procedure. Indeed, members of Congress and the federal judiciary as well
as scholars have found troubling, and have attempted to address, the four
reversals, while many observers agree with much else, such as growing
balkanization, which he describes.78 Unfortunately, certain ways that the
author apparently misperceives modern process might have led him to
develop inadvisable recommendations.
II. DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
PRESCRIPTIONS IN NEW DEAL'S END

In the last section of his article, Professor Walker derives insights from
recent political events to specify reform' s scope and method.79 The writer
urges proceduralists to accept inevitable political change and consider it
when planning reform but candidly admits that they may differ about how

See supra notes 44-53, 64-65 and accompanying text.
Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REY. 837, 1030 (1984).
See generally Walker, supra note 1.
See id.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Caution is also warranted in extrapolating from
the four changes or the New Deal's end to generalize about procedure.
78. See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View ofCongressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 99, 99 (1991); Hughes, supra note 37, at 3-8; Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequences ofModem Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REY. 631.
79. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1289-90.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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to do so.80 The lack of empirical data and temporal perspective on relevant
developments and their complex, dynamic nature confound efforts to
assess his proposals. However, I can evaluate them by identifying the
principal problems for which he posits suggestions.
A Scope
When examining reform's scope, Professor Walker asserts that
"[m]ajor change in political structure and practice requires bold action"
and calls for a national commission or study entity to canvass present
process and to formulate recommendations for improvement.81 The author
modestly finds that "less drastic ways to improve the current system,"
some of which he had earlier proffered, may be insufficient, that "the case
for fundamental review is now powerful [, and that] the changed political
circumstances suggest the need for a general review by some group
different from the bodies currently employed."82 By way of contrast, he
considers and deems deficient two recent endeavors which traditional
entities undertook. Professor Walker claims that proposals developed in a
rule revision survey by the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) "seem[] unlikely to produce
much effective reform."83 The writer believes that most of the
prescriptions, which implicate only management of the existing process are
narrow and fail to address the critical difficulties posed by the altered
political situation while finding several inadequate. 84 He similarly
characterizes the Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules, a
"'blackletter statement of principles' for modem rule-drafting," as
unresponsive to recent political changes because they focus on style.85
There is consensus about certain features of his recommendations.
Numerous federal courts observers agree that many complications, which
are problematic enough to warrant remediation, plague modem procedure
and have attempted to craft solutions. 86 Several people have urged that
some study group conduct a basic analysis or have proposed moving

80. See id. at 1286.
81. Id. at 1286-87.
82. Id. at 1287. His ideas remain saJient. would be improvements, and should be applied.
83. Id.; see Subcomm. on Long Range Planning, Comm. on Rules of Practice, Procedure and
Evidence of the JudiciaJ Conf. of the U.S., A Self-Study of Federal JudiciaJ Rulemaking, 168
F.R.D. 679, 683-84 (1995); id. at 695 n.50 (showing my participation).
84. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1287-88.
85. Id. at 1288; see also Bryan A. Gamer, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules (1996).
86. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45
DUKE L.J. 929 (1996); Mullenix, supra note 41, at 379; Robel, supra note 48, at 49-50; see also
supra note 78.
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outside the ordinary rule revision process. 87 Few would quarrel with
Professor Walker's contention that the efforts of conventional entities
discussed above will lead to meaningful reform.
Disagreement does attend other aspects of the suggestions. His calls for
bold action and for a searching study appear premature because process
seems less splintered and more settled and amenable to remediation than
it was in 1996 when he authored New Deal's End. For instance, a recent
Ninth Circuit review of fifteen districts' measures has promise for
curtailing proliferation, and many courts no longer employ entities or
mechanisms prescribed under the CJRA, which has essentially expired. 88
Congress's acute disinterest in resolving the CJRA's fate suggests that
Congress is less disposed to make procedural policy. The national revisors'
empirical studies of discovery and their new proposal for amending the
discovery provisions and abolishing opt-outs may manifest revitalized
commitments to expertise, centralization, uniformity, and recapturing
primary responsibility for process. 89
In short, procedure today is not perfect or even greatly improved, but
it does appear less turbulent and fractured, and more responsive to
treatment, than in recent years. The prospects for solving or at least
ameliorating the major difficulties with process seem considerably better.
It, therefore, appears preferable at this juncture to exhaust the existing
mechanisms for modifying procedure.
B. Method
Professor Walker urges that a study group explore contemporary
models to reconfigure the Federal Rules by capitalizing on post-New Deal
restructuring in other fields. He offers the example of welfare reform,
which purportedly shares important similarities with the Rules in the
context of New Deal politics: both "were centralized in the national
government during the 1930s, [were] designed by a small group of experts
and ... enhanced the federal role in social reform." 90 Measures for
adjusting welfare programs to new political realities, thus, might receive
analogous application to the Rules and yield "four strong candidates ... :
the use of waivers, enhanced local control, mandatory research, and use of
incentives." 91
87. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 854-55 (1993); Carl Tobias, More Modem Civil Process, 56
U. Prrr. L. REV. 801, 839 (1995).
88. See supra notes 44-45, infra notes 126·29, 132 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 53, infra notes 126, 136·38 and accompanying text. But see supra note
29.
90. Walker, supra note 1, at 1288 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1289.
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The author explains that waivers facilitate short-term change by
permitting exceptions from generally applicable national requirements. 92
Increased district control accommodates long-term modification by
assigning non-federal entities responsibility for implementation's specifics,
subject to national oversight that assures a degree of local similarity.93
Research mandates accord the alteration a practical dimension, while
incentives encourage attempts to satisfy policy goals.94 Professor Walker
finds these concepts particularly attractive because they should foster
needed change by diminishing the focus on disputed political values.95
He next applies the method's four features to procedural reform.96 First,
legislation could authorize districts to waive federal rules with approval of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Administrative
Office), thereby expanding local control yet preserving national
oversight.97 Second, over time a series of waivers might increase
delegation, subject to several limitations. 98 For example, individual courts
could prescribe their own procedures restrained only by certain general
principles, such as notice pleading or liberal discovery.99 The author
contends that this approach would permit the enforcement of broad federal
policies but afford enhanced flexibility to treat local ·conditions and
experiment. 100 Third, a statute might include research commands and even
suggest appropriate methodologies. 101 For instance, courts which assemble
information according to designated techniques could modify specific
rules. 102 Fourth, incentives might be employed to encourage enterprise in
case resolution by, for example, lifting federal strictures when districts
demonstrate successful docket management. 103
There is some consensus about various facets of the method
recommended. 104 A few legal scholars have endorsed, albeit in principle,
the precepts of increased local control and mandatory research105 or
92. See id. at 1289-90.
93. Seeid.
94. Seeid.
95. Seeid.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. Another possibility, "requir[ing] conformity to local state procedure,'' would
produce interstate uniformity. Id. at 1290 n.180; see also Subrin, supra note 22, at 2005-11.
100. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1290.
101. See id. at 1291.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1590-93 (1991); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998).
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ancillary features, such as the notion that empirical data should underlie
federal rule revision. 106 Indeed, these ideas were integral to the 1991
proposed amendment of Rule 83 which the national revisors withdrew out
of respect for contemporaneous CJRA testing. 107
However, disagreement and controversy attend the method. As general
matters, waivers, enhanced local control, and incentives could impose a
system which is an administrative and practical nightmare and even a
prescription for chaos. For instance, CJRA implementation suggests, and
Professor Walker recognizes, that districts and their advisors might rely on
the three concepts to apply measures which are more solicitous of the
needs of local judges, lawyers, and parties than of national uniformity and
simplicity, thus compounding balkanization. 108
Each of the "four strong candidates" would apparently entail
disadvantages.Waivers, increased local control, and incentives that permit
the removal of federal requirements could undermine the national,
consistent simple regime of procedure embodied in the original Rules
which has facilitated prompt, inexpensive and fair dispute resolution. 109 For
example, an incentive structure that rewards courts which "successfully
manage" litigation by excusing their enforcement of federal strictures
might be less equitable because more or faster dispositions may not
produce fairer substantive results or because it could deprive parties of the
procedural tools that they need to prove cases. 110 A scheme which
encourages all ninety-four districts to secure removal or waivers of the 86
Federal Rules at different times also means that disparate requirements
might govern litigation in every court and that the entire system could be
in perpetual flux.
The prospects for enlarging local control but maintaining national
oversight, especially through the Administrative Office, are not very
auspicious. Limited, and perhaps failed, effectuation of similar monitoring
under the CJRA and the JIA by the Judicial Conference and circuit review

106. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank. The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Samuel Estreicher, Foreword:
Federal Class Actions After 30 Years, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996).
107. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Proposed Rules:
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure and the Federal
Rules ofEvidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991).
108. See Carrington, supra note 86, at 963-64; Tobias, supra note 16, at 1405-06; see also
supra notes 19-21, 41-43 and accompanying text
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level
ofRule: The Example ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure l, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995); Resnik,
supra note 14, at 502-15; Tobias, supra note 14, at 272-77.
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Cohn, supra note 78, at 99; Lauren K. Robel, The Politics
of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 115 (1991); Tobias, supra note 16,
at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 24, at 1602.
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entities, institutions which are comprised of Article III judges, inspire little
confidence in the Administrative Office which has less independence,
while the Advisory Committee's proposed 1991 amendment of Rule 83
lodged analogous responsibility in the Conference. m
CJRA experimentation correspondingly indicates that greater district
control would worsen the above problems, namely fragmentation, and
introduce others, such as erosion of national rule revision.11 2 Local
procedure would become more diverse among the ninety-four courts and
depart further from the Federal Rules. The difficulty of finding, mastering,
and satisfying different local measures would increase civil cases'
complexity and expense and would frustrate efforts of lawyers and parties
to litigate in multiple districts. Federal mandates' waiver and removal and
enhanced local control, thus, might well prove more disruptive than optouts.
The research provisions prescribed seem constructive because reliance
on empirical material that evaluators have systematically collected,
analyzed and synthesized should improve the quality of proposals for
modifying procedure. However, numerous districts may lack the requisite
expertise and resources to design and complete the type of research
projects which Professor Walker envisions.
The method that New Deal's End suggests, therefore, would
significantly complicate federal civil practice. The decentralization and
localization recommended could additionally splinter the already fractured
condition of process and leave it less expert and more parochial. Indeed,
Professor Walker's prescriptions would apparently exacerbate certain of
procedure's worst features, principally balkanization, which he most
vociferously criticizes.
In sum, his approach may improve process, but the relative paucity of
dependable empirical data, especially regarding welfare reform' s efficacy
and applicability to procedural change, complicates assessment of central
ideas in New Deal's End. The last section, accordingly, provides
suggestions that should enhance process with means which resemble
Professor Walker's method but that are less extreme and, thus, potentially
more effective. 113
111. See Levin, supra note 105, at 1588-93; Tobias, supra note 16, at 1406-09; Tobias, supra
note 23, at 60-61; infra notes 130-33, 144 and accompanying text
112. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1284.
113. See id. at 1290-91. In the end, he does not definitively show that the analogies between
states and federal districts and between welfare and procedural reform are apposite or that process's
problems are sufficiently severe to warrant rather extreme solutions. The 50 states are very different
units of government than the 94 districts with dissimilar purposes, constituencies and relationships
to the national government Each court is part of a broader system comprising 94 districts which
ostensibly resolve civil litigation similarly by applying analogous measures. These strictures, their
revision process, the national, uniform, simple system and the procedures' reform, thus, depart
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE

These recommendations warrant comparatively limited examination in
this response because a number have been explored elsewhere or can be
felicitously implemented by applying or adjusting approaches which now
exist or have been analyzed. For example, many scholars have written
articles on the topics; 114 expert evaluators, such as the RAND Corporation
and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), have scrutinized some relevant
issues; 115 and circuit judicial councils, federal districts, and individual
judges have employed certain of the concepts. 116 Moreover, reliance on
existing or recalibrated mechanisms, including the 1988 JIA's provisions
for limiting proliferation117 or invocation of previously-broached
techniques, namely the 1991 proposed revision in Rule 83 for facilitating
experimentation with promising measures, 118 would apparently improve
procedure and effectuate much of Professor Walker's method.
Prescriptions related to the compilation, assessment, and synthesis of
additional applicable information on current process are also illustrative.
Writers have proffered quite a few ideas respecting that material. 119 Much
instructive information is correspondingly available, 120 such as the insights
generated on proliferation by the Local Rules Project's continuing work121
on mandatory local reform by analyses of CJRA testing, 122 and on opt-outs
by the Advisory Committee discovery study. Sufficient material exists
today, even though evaluators could gather and scrutinize greater and more
reliable information. For instance, there is a wealth of material on the
seven-year CJRA experiment which deserves collection before it is lost or
dramatically from the substance, and even the process of, welfare. Managing public assistance or
entitlement programs differs from resolving federal civil cases or even administering justice in a
court of law. Finally, the lack of empirical data limits greater exposition of these ideas, while
modern procedure's more settled state and its enhanced amenability to treatment mean that the
existing processes explored below should suffice.
114. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 86; Robel, supra note 48, at 50; Subrin, supra note 22,
at 2016-18.
115. See infra notes 122, 128.
116. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text
117. See infra note 131 and accompanying text
118. See supra note 107 and accompanying text
119. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and
Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Refonn, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1998); Oakley,
supra note 52, at 437-38; Tobias, supra note 23, at 68-75.
120. See supra note 17 and accompanying text
121. See infra note 128.
122. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis ofthe Civil
Justice Refonn Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An
Empirical Study ofDiscovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments,
39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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memories of those involved fade, while assessors might refine the large
quantity of available raw data, such as the information that RAND, the
FJC, and districts assembled. 123
It would be preferable to base suggestions on the maximum feasible
amount of dependable, empirical material which expert, independent
evaluators have systematically compiled, analyzed and synthesized.
However, I can offer numerous recommendations that could address
procedure's difficulties which Professor Walker and additional observers
identify by assuming that they are troubling enough to warrant remediation
and by relying on the plethora of current information. My proposals also
can be recalibrated as more material becomes available or as assessors
refine available information.
The four changes that the author scrutinizes, and related developments
which others have examined, have created problems that require treatment.
These phenomena have essentially undermined the national, uniform, and
simple trans-substantive regime of the original Federal Rules, which has
facilitated expeditious, economical and equitable dispute resolution. 124 In
fairness, that characterization is an ideal which Congress, national rule
revisors, districts, and judges often honored in the breach, while their
efforts to promote such disposition ironically may have eroded this
scheme. My suggestions are intended to revitalize and maintain the system
and the federal amendment process, which have worked well for six
decades, and to foster application of measures that will address unusual
local difficulties or whose testing could improve the Rules. The approach,
therefore, basically employs Professor Walker's method but with less
potential disruption. Congress can implement most ofthese ideas, although
the judiciary, through national and local revision entities, districts, and
judges, might effectuate many. 125
A The CJRA and Its Expiration

Congress must definitively resolve the fate of the CJRA that was
scheduled to expire in 1997. It is unclear whether the Act did sunset then,
and, thus, whether statutorily-prescribed strictures, which fragmented

123. See infra note 128; Mullenix, supra note 105, at 683 (finding a "wealth of statistical
information" on discovery in studies cited in supra note 122). In fairness, little data on welfare
refonn and its applicability to procedure exist because Congress only reformed welfare in 1996.
124. See supra note 109 and accompanying text
125. My ideas may be insufficiently realistic as a political matter. The CJRA and the PSLRA
further fragmented, and Congress has recently seemed rather unconcerned about the process.
However, these may be aberrations. The provisions for limiting proliferation in the IlA, Rule 83
and the 1991 proposal to amend Rule 83 had potential. Thus, the venerable system should be
permitted to work as originally intended before jettisoning it
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procedure and complicated civil practice, remain applicable. 126 Lawmakers
should evaluate CJRA testing and identify the mechanisms that were
sufficiently effective to deserve inclusion in the Federal Rules or
legislation and those which were less efficacious, yet promising, for
additional experimentation or for consideration in the national revision
process. For example, Congress indefinitely extended CJRA case reporting
mandates related to disposition times in 1997,127 but did not address the
Act's other aspects, especially whether the measures tested were salutary ·
enough to warrant broader application. 128 Once lawmakers have so
classified the procedures, they must clearly state that the CJRA has expired
and that districts must eliminate all entities, namely advisory groups, and
all local provisions invoked thereunder. The courts should abrogate or
merge those institutions which conflict with existing bodies 129 and abolish
the strictures that violate or duplicate the Federal Rules, statutes, or district
local rules, even if Congress does not conclusively resolve the CJRA's
fate.
These proposals should eliminate many proliferating mechanisms
which districts and judges prescribed during the 1990s principally pursuant
to the CJRA. The recommendations would essentially reinstate the
procedural status quo that obtained when Congress and the Supreme Court
adopted those features of the 1988 JIA and of Rule 83's 1985 revision
which they intended to decrease proliferation.
B. Limiting Local Proliferation Under the JIA and Rule 83
Circuit judicial councils, district courts, and individual judges must
implement the provisos in the JIA and the 1985 and 1995 amendments of
Rule 83 that proscribe local measures which conflict with or repeat the
Federal Rules, legislation, or district local rules. For instance, courts and
judges who have yet to effectuate Rule 83' s command that standing orders
not contravene or duplicate the above provisions should expeditiously

126. See Judicial Improvements Act ofl 990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 482(b)(2), 104 Stat.
5089, 5096; see also Mullenix, supra note 41, at 379. See generally Carl Tobias, Did the Civil
Justice Refonn Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 887 (1998).
127. See Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173 (1997).
128. Congress could consult studies and recommendations on the pilot and demonstration
programs by the Judicial Conference, RAND and the FJC, but they make few conclusive
suggestions as to specific measures and essentially support reinstating the procedural status quo,
even though the underlying data collected may be helpful. Congress could also evaluate devices
tested in the other79 districts. Mechanisms in the general areas of case management, discovery and
alternatives to dispute resolution seem efficacious, and some particular techniques, such as
telephonic conferences, save time or money. See Tobias, supra note 44.
129. Advisory groups realized their purposes and conflict with local rules committees under
the IlA and, thus, should be abolished or merged with them. See Tobias, supra note 24, at 1628.
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comply. 130 Circuit councils, which have similarly failed to evaluate local
procedures and abrogate or alter those that are inconsistent or repetitive as
the JIA and Rule 83' s 1995 revision mandate, 131 must promptly do so. The
councils could capitalize on the Ninth Circuit's efficacious discharge of
these responsibilities. 132 The court's careful scrutiny of fifteen districts'
strictures indicates that other councils might attain analogous success,
particularly if Congress appropriates funds for monitoring and the CJRA,
which essentially suspended the commands' implementation, expires.
Should the duties' performance not improve because authoritY to eliminate
or change violative measures is overly diffuse or councils lack the resolve
or resources to increase uniformity, Congress might consider more extreme
approaches, such as a standing committee on local procedures which could
police proliferation rather rigorously through centralized oversight. 133
The effectuation of these recommendations would reduce conflicting
and redundant local requirements that existed in 1988 and measures that
courts or judges have applied since then outside the context of CJRA
experimentation. The suggestions should contribute to the revival and
maintenance of the federal rule amendment process and of a national,
uniform, simple trans-substantive procedural regime.

C. Additional Suggestions for Improving National

Revision and Modem Procedure
A number of additional actions could improve the federal revision
process and current procedure. The institutions which study the Rules and
develop proposed amendments, Congress, district courts, and judges must
make the needs of the civil justice system paramount, exercise appropriate
restraint, and cooperate more when modifying procedure. 134 For example,
the national revisors ought to recommend, and lawmakers should acquiesce
in, rule changes that will best serve all whom litigation affects. The rule
amendment entities should also honor the citizen participation mandates
in the JIA and Rule 83 by seeking and scrutinizing the greatest possible
input of applicable interests when considering suggested alterations, while
they must be alert to and reject the efforts of those who could secure
strategic or other advantages from modifications. 135

130. See FED. R. ClV. P. 83(b); see also FED. R. ClV. P. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note.
131. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(a),(c) (1994); FED. R. ClV. P. 83, 1995 amendment
132. See DISTRICT LocAL RULES REVIEW COMMl'ITEE, REPoRT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1997). See generally Tobias, supra note 19, at 79.
133. See Tobias, supra note 23, at 79.
134. See id. at 77.
135. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994); FED. R. ClV. P. 83; see also Hughes, supra note
37, at 1-4 (finding much input in 1993 revision process); Tobias, supra note 24, at 1599-1601
(analyzing mandates). But cf. Mullenix, supra note 21, at 830 (analyzing mandates' problems).
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The national revisors might also revitalize and sustain the federal
amendment process and the national, consistent, simple scheme by
recapturing primary responsibility for procedural change. One helpful
means of doing so is to rescind the local option provisions which govern
discovery in the 1993 Federal Rules modifications, an endeavor that the
Standing Committee has already initiated. 136 The strictures undermine
national entities and processes and the Federal Rules, 137 while the revisors,
by prescribing opt-outs, may have evinced insufficient commitment, and
even indifference, to preserving a national, uniform code of procedure. 138
Reviving and perpetuating the federal amendment process and the
national, consistent, simple regime will correspondingly require that
Congress accord greater deference to federal revision and be more
restrained when making procedural policy than it recently has. 139 Solons
should refrain from directly amending the Rules and only modify proposals
developed through the extensive revision process which they find clearly
unwarranted. 140 Lawmakers must accede to the national amendment
institutions that have accumulated much relevant expertise, especially
regarding effective procedures, while the entities are ostensibly less
political and recommend revisions which are best for the civil justice
system. 141 Deference is concomitantly indicated because rule amendment
is an important, if not a core, judicial responsibility, even though the
Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act recognize Congress's interest in
revision. 142
Lawmakers should also limit their procedural policymaking. The
CJRA's passage epitomized that phenomenon, and many judges
considered the Act an ill-advised attempt of a co-equal branch to
micromanage the courts. 143 Congress must insert fewer strictures in
statutes, and it might even delete existing requirements, namely the
PSLRA's commands related to class actions, as they undercut the federal

136. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Congress or districts could abrogate opt-outs
or local rules adopted thereunder, but respect for federal revision suggests deference.
137. Expiration of the CJRA, which was a major reason for opt-outs' inclusion in the 1993
federal revisions, and adoption of Rule 83's 1991 proposed revision should obviate the need for
opt-outs. See supra notes 52-53, 126-29, infra note 144 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 52, at 437-38; Robel, supra note 48, at 50; Tobias, supra
note 23, at 64. But see Carrington, supra note 52, at 304-06. For more ideas on recapturing
responsibility, see Oakley, supra note 52, at 446-48; Tobias, supra note 23, at 77-79; supra notes
134-35, infra note 144.
139. See Tobias, supra note 24, at 1627-28.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See U.S. CONST. art. ill,§§ 1-2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994).
143. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 78, at 99; Mullenix, supra note 41, at 399-401; Robel, supra
note 40, at 1450. But see Biden, supra note 43.
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amendment process and the national, uniform, simple, trans-substantive
scheme. However, solons should prescribe procedure when important
policy reasons or questions of authority warrant congressional action. One
trenchant example is a 1991 change in Federal Rule 83, which would have
empowered districts that secured Judicial Conference approval to test
conflicting local measures for five years, but which the national revisors
retracted in deference to ongoing CJRA implementation. 144 This tempered
approach deserves legislative adoption because it carefully balances the
need for constructive experimentation with proliferation's restriction and
because Congress is the preferable entity to authorize departures from the
JIA' s prohibition on inconsistent and redundant local mechanisms. 145
Districts and individual judges could correspondingly promote the
rejuvenation and maintenance of the national amendment process and the
procedural regime by limiting their erosion which proliferating strictures
effect. 146 For instance, courts and judges should cease prescribing new, and
abolish or alter current, requirements that contravene or repeat Federal
Rules, statutes, or district local rules, unless they must treat peculiar
problems which those provisions do not address or experiment with
measures that will enhance process. 147 Of course, the 1991 proposed
change in Rule 83 would be responsive to these contingencies. 148
The above suggestions should improve federal revision and procedure
in many ways. For example, both might be revitalized and sustained if
Congress exercised more restraint in the amendment process and in making
procedural policy. The system of centrally coordinated testing would foster
promising experimentation, could reduce duplicative research as well as
conflicting and redundant district strictures, and should vitiate the need for
opt-outs. This scheme would also effectuate several features, such as
increased local control and mandatory research, of Professor Walker's
method with less disturbance of longstanding, efficacious arrangements.
N. CONCLUSION

New Deal's End significantly advances comprehension of modem
federal civil procedure. I have attempted to elaborate Professor Walker's
informative description and to recommend more felicitous means for
achieving the goal of his provocative prescriptions. If those responsible for

144. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
145. See Levin, supra note 105, at 1585-86; Tobias, supra note 24, at 1616; see also supra
note 32 and accompanying text (analyzing procedures Congress included in statutes).
146. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra note 19.
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. l, 83; see also sµpra notes 109, 124, 129-32 & 136.
148. See supra notes 107, 144-45 and accompanying text.
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process implement my suggestions, they can improve procedure at the
beginning of the twenty-first century.

